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• The move to European Banking Union involving the supervision and re-
solution of banks at euro-area level was stimulated by the sovereign
debt crisis in the euro area in 2012. However, the long-term objective
of Banking Union is dealing with intensified cross-border banking.
• The share of the assets of national banking systems that come from
other EU countries was rising before the financial and economic
crisis of 2007, but went into decline thereafter in the context of a
general retrenchment of international banking. Most recent data,
however, suggests the decline has been halted. About 14 percent
of the assets of banks in Banking Union come from other EU coun-
tries, while about a quarter of the assets of the top 25 banks in the
Banking Union are held in other EU countries.
• While a crisis-prevention framework for the euro area has largely
been completed, the crisis-management framework remains in-
complete, potentially creating instability. There is no governance
mechanism to resolve disputes between different levels of crisis-
management agencies, and incentives to promote optimum over-
sight are lacking. Most importantly, risk-sharing mechanisms do
not adequately address the sovereign-bank loop, with a lack of cla-
rity about the divide between bail-in and bail-out.
• To complete Banking Union, the lender-of-last-resort and deposit
insurance functions should move to the euro-area level, breaking
the sovereign-bank loop. A fully-fledged single deposit insurance
(and resolution) fund should be favoured over a reinsurance
scheme for reasons of cost and simplicity.
Dirk Schoenmaker (dirk.schoenmaker@bruegel.org) is a Senior Fellow at
Bruegel and Professor of Banking and Finance at Rotterdam School of
Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam. This paper will appear as a
chapter in the Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, edited by
Thorsten Beck and Barbara Casu Lukac. The author is grateful to Sander
Oosterloo and Nicolas Véron for useful discussions and comments but
remains solely responsible for the views in this paper.
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1. Introduction 
The Banking Union is a milestone in European banking integration. While supervision of 
European banks by national supervisors was loosely coordinated through the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), the Banking Union has positioned the European Central Bank (ECB) as centralised 
supervisor of the European banks, initially in the euro area. The Banking Union creates a paradigm shift 
for the various stakeholders. French and Dutch banks become euro-area banks. National supervisors 
work together with the ECB in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with the ECB ultimately in 
charge. Customers may at some point choose a bank from another euro-area country as their ‘home’ 
bank.  
While academics have argued for a long time that the increasing intensity of cross-border 
banking would need European banking supervision and resolution (eg Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 
1992; Schoenmaker, 1997; Vives, 2001; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2009), the immediate reason for 
the sudden move to Banking Union was the intensifying euro sovereign crisis (Véron, 2011; Pisani-
Ferry et al, 2012). The stated aim is to break the sovereign-bank loop, whereby the credit standing of 
nation states and banks are interlinked, and by implication, to organise bank risk sharing at the euro-
area level. 
This paper shows that bank risk sharing has been only partly achieved in the current set-up of 
the Banking Union. Some work remains to be done, notably in the field of deposit insurance (Gros and 
Schoenmaker, 2014; Véron, 2015). Moreover, the mix of national agencies (for deposit insurance) and 
European agencies (for supervision and resolution) makes the Banking Union arrangement potentially 
instable. There is no governmental mechanism to settle disputes between agencies operating at 
different levels. 
Now the euro sovereign crisis seems to be tamed, it is interesting to look at the long-term 
rationale for Banking Union. This paper therefore documents cross-border banking trends in the 
European Union. Importantly, we find that cross-border banking is not only pervasive in the euro area, 
but also in the non-euro area member states of the EU. The latter may wish to join the Banking Union at 
a later stage. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the rationale behind the Banking Union. 
Section 3 documents the advance of cross-border banking in Europe. Section 4 analyses what the new 
governance framework of the Banking Union is about. We stress that the Banking Union should be seen 
as an integrated framework. Section 5 explains the completed building blocks of Banking Union, in 
particular single supervision and single resolution. Next, Section 6 discusses which building blocks are 
not yet completed, notably European Deposit Insurance. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The rationale for Banking Union 
The decision to move to Banking Union was taken suddenly at the height of the euro sovereign 
crisis in 2012. The vicious circle between the solvency of nation states in the euro area and the 
solvency of these nation states’ banks contributed to the crisis. The sovereign-bank loop works two-
way. First, banks carry large amounts of bonds of their own government on their balance sheet 
(Battistini et al, 2014). So, a deterioration of a government’s credit standing would automatically 
worsen the solvency of that country’s banks. Second, a worsening of a country’s banking system could 
worsen the government’s budget because of a potential government financed bank bailout. Alter and 
Schüler (2012) and Erce (2015) provide evidence of interdependence between government and bank 
credit risk during the crisis. 
The sovereign-bank loop argument relates to the euro area, where national central banks 
cannot issue money and buy government bonds without limit because the ECB is in charge. To break 
the loop, the European Council decided to move the responsibility for banking rescues to the euro-area 
level. If ex-post rescues are organised at this level, ex-ante supervision should also be moved in 
tandem to minimise the need for such rescues (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2009). So, the essence of 
Banking Union is supervision and resolution of banks at the euro-area level. Nevertheless, we argue in 
Section 6 that the risk sharing arrangements are not yet complete. 
The long-term reason for Banking Union is cross-border banking. The financial trilemma states 
that the three objectives of financial stability, cross-border banking and national financial policies 
cannot be achieved at the same time; one has to give (Schoenmaker, 2011). The combination of cross-
border banking and national supervision and resolution leads to coordination failure between national 
authorities, which put national interests first (see, for example, the abortive rescue of Fortis). This in 
turn puts financial stability at risk. The advance to Banking Union solves this coordination failure by 
adopting supranational policies. The coordination failure argument is related to the Single Market 
(which allows unfettered cross-border banking), and thus to the European Union as a whole. 
The Banking Union has struck a compromise between these two goals. Participation is 
mandatory for euro-area member states, and optional for non-euro area members (Hertig et al, 2010). 
In that way, the door is kept open to address the coordination failure in cross-border banking also for 
non-euro area members at a later stage. 
 
3. Cross-border banking 
What is the intensity of cross-border banking in the European Union? Section 3.1 provides 
evidence on the level of inward banking at the country level. A high level of inward banking limits the 
capacity of national authorities to manage the stability of their financial system. Next, section 3.2 
documents the outward banking flows of the largest banks. The home-country authorities only take the 
domestic share of a bank’s business into account when considering a bank rescue, while they may 
have to pay the full cost of the rescue. A high cross-border share may therefore lead to coordination 
failure as witnessed with the Fortis rescue efforts in 2008 (Schoenmaker, 2013). 
 
  
3.1 Inward banking flows 
The global financial crisis has led to a retrenchment of international banking. Troubled banks 
typically first cut back on their foreign business. Moreover, banks that received state aid were often 
pressured by national authorities to maintain domestic lending. Figure 1 illustrates the decline in 
cross-border penetration since 2007. Cross-border penetration is defined as the percentage of a 
country’s banking system assets coming from other European Union or third countries. New figures for 
2014 suggest that the decline has been halted. 
 
Figure 1: Cross-border penetration of European banking (EU; in % of total banking assets) 
 
Source: Bruegel based on EU Structural Financial Indicators, ECB. 
 
The aggregate figures for the European Union can be split in Banking Union countries (the 19 
euro-area members) and non-Banking Union countries (the nine outs). Table 1 shows that the Banking 
Union covers over 70 percent of total European Union banking assets. Next, Table 1 shows that the 
intensity of cross-border banking in the non-Banking Union is higher than in the Banking Union 
countries, which suggests that the supranational approach may also be useful for the outs. Zooming in 
on the outs, Table 2 shows that the large share from third countries comes from the United Kingdom, 
where London acts as international financial centre. But also the share from other EU countries is larger 
in the out countries than in the Banking Union countries. In particular, the Eastern European countries, 
including Poland, have a large cross-border share from Western Europe. These data indicate that the 
outs may consider Banking Union membership, which is optional. Such membership depends, of 
course, on wider political economy considerations. But if and when Banking Union becomes a success, 
we should not be surprised to see voluntary members knocking on the door. 
 
Table 1: Banking systems across three regions: BU, EU and US; end-2014 
  
Number of 
banks 
Total assets 
in billion Of which: home other EU third country 
Banking Union 5,516 € 30,772 83% 14% 3% 
Non-Banking Union 1,752 € 12,196 57% 19% 24% 
European Union 7,268 € 42,968 76% 16% 9% 
United States 5,643 € 12,360 84% 
 
16% 
Note: Total banking assets come from the home country, other EU countries, and third countries (i.e. outside the European 
Union or the US). The three components add up to 100 per cent. 
Source: Bruegel based on ECB for European banks and Federal Reserve and FDIC for US commercial banks. 
 
 
Table 2: Cross-border banking penetration in non-euro area member states; end-2014 
 
Total assets 
(€ billion) 
Of which: 
 home 
(%) 
other EU 
(%) 
third country 
(%) 
Bulgaria  € 47  23% 74% 3% 
Croatia  € 57  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Czech Republic  € 196  12% 88% 0% 
Denmark  € 1,082  82% 17% 1% 
Hungary  € 110  55% 42% 4% 
Poland  € 380  34% 59% 7% 
Romania  € 91  31% 69% 0% 
Sweden  € 1,245  90% 9% 1% 
United Kingdom  € 8,990  52% 17% 32% 
Non-euro area  € 12,196  57% 19% 24% 
Notes: Share of business from domestic banks, share of business of banks from other EU countries, and share of business 
of banks from third countries are measured as a percentage of the total banking assets in a country. Figures are for end 
2013. Non-euro area is calculated as a weighted average (weighted according to assets). The new division of euro area (19 
member countries) and non-euro area (9 members) as of 1 January 2015 is taken.  
Source: Bruegel based on ECB Structural Financial Indicators. 
 
3.2 Outward banking flows 
The next step is to investigate the outward banking flows of the largest banks. The international 
orientation of most of these large banks can lead to the previously mentioned coordination failure, 
whereby the home authorities concentrate on the domestic activities in crisis resolution. Foreign 
activities, either in the rest of the EU or in the rest of the world, are thus ignored. To gauge the potential 
for coordination failure, we split the assets of these banks into assets in the home country, in other EU 
countries and in third countries. Financial stability concerns are related to a bank’s assets in several 
ways. The benefits of a potential bailout can be thought of as preventing a temporary reduction of credit 
availability (credit crunch) through shortening of balance sheets by a forced liquidation of the loan 
book in a particular country. Another source of benefits is the safeguarding of financial stability of the 
total banking system, which might be jeopardised by a fire sale of assets or other externalities 
impacting negatively on aggregate investment in a country (Acharya, 2009). 
When information on the geographical segmentation of assets is not available, we use the 
segmentation of credit exposures of the loan book, the most important asset class, as a proxy. The 
basis source for our data is banks’ annual reports. Further information on credit exposure is available in 
the published stress test results for 2014 of the European Banking Authority. The full methodology for 
measuring geographic segmentation is described in Schoenmaker (2013). Under the new Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD IV), financial institutions must disclose, by country in which it operates 
through a subsidiary or a branch, information about turnover, number of employees and profit before 
tax. This extra information allows us to refine the geographical split at country level. 
Table 3 shows the top 25 banks in the Banking Union have 24 percent of their assets in other 
EU countries and 17 percent in third countries. The potential improvement of Banking Union is the 24 
percent share in other EU countries, as the supranational resolution agency takes all Banking Union 
assets into account when considering a bailout (Schoenmaker and Siegmann, 2014). Moving to the 
non-Banking Union, Table 4 indicates that the top 10 banks have 18 percent of their assets in other EU 
countries and 32 percent in third countries. The European share is slightly less, while the global share 
is far larger for the UK banks. The similarity in the European share confirms that Banking Union can 
have the same benefits for the outs (see also Darvas and Wolff, 2013, who provide detailed case 
studies). In particular, the Scandinavian banks, Nordea, Danske, Svenska, SEB Group and Swedbank, 
would benefit from the risk sharing in a Banking Union. But that is also valid for Barclays, which is inter 
alia active in France, Germany, Italy and Spain.  
 
  
Table 3: Top 25 banks in Banking Union in 2014 (based on pre-BUA segmentation) 
 
Banking groups  
Total assets (in 
billion) 
Of which: 
home other EU third country 
1 BNP Paribas (FR)  € 2,077  34% 44% 22% 
2 Crédit Agricole (FR)  € 1,762  80% 10% 10% 
3 Deutsche Bank (DE)  € 1,708  29% 28% 43% 
4 Société Générale (FR)  € 1,308  72% 14% 14% 
5 Banco Santander (ES)  € 1,266  26% 40% 34% 
6 Groupe BPCE (FR)  € 1,223  90% 2% 8% 
7 UniCredit (IT)  € 844  43% 51% 6% 
8 ING Bank (NL)  € 828  36% 50% 14% 
9 Crédit Mutuel (FR)  € 706  89% 8% 3% 
10 Rabobank (NL)  € 681  75% 6% 19% 
11 Intesa Sanpaolo (IT)  € 646  87% 10% 3% 
12 BBVA (ES)  € 632  43% 16% 42% 
13 Commerzbank (DE)  € 557  50% 34% 16% 
14 DZ Bank (DE)  € 402  76% 16% 8% 
15 ABN AMRO (NL)  € 387  75% 15% 9% 
16 La Caixa Group (ES)  € 339  89% 10% 2% 
17 Landesbank Baden-Württemb. (DE)  € 266  76% 16% 8% 
18 KBC Group (BE)  € 245  52% 43% 5% 
19 Bankia (ES)  € 242  86% 13% 1% 
20 Bayerische Landesbank (DE)  € 232  77% 15% 8% 
21 Banque Postale (FR)  € 213  93% 7% 0% 
22 Nord LB (DE)  € 198  84% 12% 4% 
23 Erste Group (AT)  € 196  46% 52% 2% 
24 Belfius (BE)  € 194  71% 24% 5% 
25 Banca Monte dei Paschi (IT)  € 183  94% 6% 1% 
 Top 25 Banking Union  € 17,335  59% 24% 17% 
 
Notes: Top 25 banks are selected on the basis of total assets (as published in The Banker). Assets are divided over the home 
country, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. Top 25 banks is calculated as a weighted average (weighted according 
to assets). 
Source: Bruegel based on annual reports. 
 
  
Table 4: Top 10 banks in non-Banking Union in 2014 
 
Banking groups  
Total assets (in 
billion) 
Of which: 
home other EU third country 
1 HSBC (UK)  € 2,170  33% 9% 58% 
2 Barclays (UK)  € 1,745  37% 24% 38% 
3 Royal Bank of Scotland (UK)  € 1,350  74% 5% 21% 
4 Lloyds Banking Group (UK)  € 1,099  96% 2% 1% 
5 Nordea (SE)  € 669  24% 74% 1% 
6 Standard Chartered (UK)  € 598  12% 4% 84% 
7 Danske Bank (DK)  € 465  62% 38% 0% 
8 Svenska Handelsbanken (SE)  € 300  59% 27% 14% 
9 SEB Group (SE)  € 281  60% 32% 8% 
10 Swedbank (SE)  € 226  76% 19% 5% 
      
 Top 10 non-Banking Union  € 8,902  50% 18% 32% 
 
Notes: Top 10 banks are selected on the basis of total assets (as published in The Banker). Assets are divided over the home 
country, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. Top 10 banks is calculated as a weighted average (weighted according 
to assets). 
Source: Bruegel based on annual reports. 
 
The actual improvement in resolution has to be calculated on the basis of the Banking Union 
Area (BUA), which is confined to the euro-area countries at the time of writing but may expand to non-
euro area countries on a voluntary basis. The new home base is the entire Banking Union Area. To 
assess the improvement, we split banks’ assets in other EU countries into other BUA countries and non-
BUA countries. Table 5 shows that the new home share in the Banking Union amounts to 74 percent (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 = 0.74), an improvement of 15 percentage points compared to the home share in the pre-
Banking Union era (ℎ = 0.59). 
 
  
Table 5: Top 25 banks in Banking Union in 2014 (based on BUA segmentation) 
 
Banking groups  
Total assets (in 
billion) 
Of which: 
BUA non-BUA third country 
1 BNP Paribas (FR)  € 2,077  68% 10% 22% 
2 Crédit Agricole (FR)  € 1,762  87% 3% 10% 
3 Deutsche Bank (DE)  € 1,708  48% 8% 43% 
4 Société Générale (FR)  € 1,308  77% 9% 14% 
5 Banco Santander (ES)  € 1,266  34% 32% 34% 
6 Groupe BPCE (FR)  € 1,223  91% 1% 8% 
7 UniCredit (IT)  € 844  71% 23% 6% 
8 ING Bank (NL)  € 828  74% 12% 14% 
9 Crédit Mutuel (FR)  € 706  96% 1% 3% 
10 Rabobank (NL)  € 681  78% 3% 19% 
11 Intesa Sanpaolo (IT)  € 646  92% 5% 3% 
12 BBVA (ES)  € 632  54% 5% 42% 
13 Commerzbank (DE)  € 557  68% 16% 16% 
14 DZ Bank (DE)  € 402  85% 6% 8% 
15 ABN AMRO (NL)  € 387  88% 3% 9% 
16 La Caixa Group (ES)  € 339  94% 4% 2% 
17 Landesbank Baden-Württemb. (DE)  € 266  89% 3% 8% 
18 KBC Group (BE)  € 245  71% 24% 5% 
19 Bankia (ES)  € 242  95% 4% 1% 
20 Bayerische Landesbank (DE)  € 232  87% 5% 8% 
21 Banque Postale (FR)  € 213  98% 2% 0% 
22 Nord LB (DE)  € 198  93% 3% 4% 
23 Erste Group (AT)  € 196  60% 37% 2% 
24 Belfius (BE)  € 194  87% 8% 5% 
25 Banca Monte dei Paschi (IT)  € 183  98% 1% 1% 
      
 Top 25 Banking Union  € 17,335  74% 9% 17% 
 
Notes: Top 25 banks are selected on the basis of total assets (as published in The Banker). Assets are divided over the home 
country (which is the Banking Union Area), the non-Banking Union Area in Europe and the rest of the world. Top 25 banks are 
calculated as a weighted average (weighted according to assets). 
Source: Bruegel based on annual reports. 
 
 
The improvement is visualised in Figure 2. In terms of costs 𝐶𝐶 (x-axis) and benefits 𝐵𝐵 (y-axis), 
the efficient benchmark is that a bailout takes place when the aggregate (world-wide) benefits exceed 
the total costs, so that the line is characterised by 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐶𝐶, i.e., a slope of 1. Thus, in the costs-benefits 
space, the line that separates bailout from no-bailouts has a slope of one. The solution pre-Banking 
Union (home country resolution) is to have a bailout only when the home country (ℎ) benefits exceed 
the total costs, i.e., ℎ ∙ 𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝐶𝐶, which leads to the line 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐶𝐶/ℎ above which a bailout takes place. 
Under a Banking Union supranational authority, bailouts take place when BU-specific (𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵) benefits 
exceed total costs, i.e 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∙ 𝐵𝐵 ≥ 𝐶𝐶. The supranational approach thus improves to the line 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐶𝐶/𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵. 
The grey area in Figure 2 identifies the area of improvement, where the burden sharing in Banking 
Union can improve on the outcome under home country resolution. 
 
Figure 2: Outcomes for the different resolution mechanisms  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Schoenmaker and Siegmann (2014). 
 
  
4. An integrated framework 
Before turning to the working of the Banking Union, we first define the overall governance 
framework for supervisory and resolution. The mandate and role of the various agencies should be 
assessed in an integrated framework to ensure a comprehensive coverage of supervisory and stability 
concerns and to align incentives of the agencies1. 
The framework for governance starts with the rule-making authority. For the financial sector, 
the ministry of finance (in the European context) typically prepares proposals for financial legislation, 
which is subsequently amended and approved by parliament. The ministry of finance thus drives the 
policy-making agenda and has ultimate responsibility for the overall design of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework. The precise division of powers between the executive (government) and the 
legislative (parliament) differs across countries. In Europe, the executive is more firmly in the driving 
seat2. For example, the United Kingdom’s HM Treasury initiated the creation of the UK FSA, after the 
landslide election victory of the Labour party in 1997. Europe follows the standard pattern with the 
executive (either the president/prime minister’s office or the finance ministry) proposing new rules and 
the parliament amending and approving these new rules. At the EU level, the European Commission has 
the right of initiative for new legislation. 
The next stage in the framework is supervision. The supervisory agency aims to prevent a 
financial crisis occurring. Regulation and supervision can be seen as a form of preventive crisis 
management. By contrast, the other financial agencies – lender of last resort, resolution, and deposit 
insurance – have to deal with a financial crisis once it occurs. That is the resolution stage. The two 
stages are interrelated. In a game-theoretical framework, the endgame of resolution also determines 
the actions of the supervisory agency (Schoenmaker, 2013). We therefore apply a backward-solving 
approach, starting from the fiscal backstop in Figure 3. 
                                                 
1 This section draws on Chapter 7 in Schoenmaker (2013). 
2 There are a few exceptions. The Finnish parliament has broad constitutional powers. A case in point is the Parliamentary 
Oversight Council overseeing Suomen Pankki, the Finnish central bank. 
The guiding principle for decision-making on crisis management is “he who pays the piper calls 
the tune” (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2009). So long as recapitalisations are organised and paid on a 
national basis, the national governments will normally want to oversee and undertake the function of 
supervision. When recapitalisations would be done at the European level, then supervision should also 
be moved to the same level. 
 
Figure 3: Governance framework for financial supervision and stability. 
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Note: The framework illustrates the ﬁve stages from rule making to the ﬁscal backstop. The top line illustrates each function. 
The bottom line shows the generic agency for each function in the national setting. 
Source: Adapted from Schoenmaker (2013). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the various functions involved in the governance framework for financial 
supervision and stability. The framework starts with the rule-making and supervisory functions. So far, 
we have used the broad term of resolution for crisis management. In the initial stage, the central bank 
may provide lender-of-last-resort assistance to help one or more banks. If that does not work, the 
deposit insurance and resolution authority comes in to decide on the appropriate line of action. The 
Global Financial Crisis showed (again) that deposit insurance is not only meant for depositor protection 
– originally initiated for protection of ‘widows and orphans’ – in the case of an idiosyncratic failure, but 
also for maintaining financial stability. The level of deposit insurance was increased across the world 
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during the Global Financial Crisis to prevent bank runs that would further destabilise the financial 
system (Engineer et al, 2013).  
Deposit insurance and resolution can thus be regarded as an integrated function (Gros and 
Schoenmaker, 2014). The least cost principle requires the resolution authority to choose the resolution 
method in which the total amount of the expenditures and (contingent) liabilities incurred has the 
lowest cost to the deposit insurance and resolution fund. The basic resolution methods include a 
(assisted) take-over by a healthy bank, a public assistance programme, and a liquidation with pay-outs 
to retail depositors under the deposit insurance scheme. The only exception to the least cost principle 
is if there are systemic risks affecting the financial system. 
The final stage in the governance framework is the fiscal backstop. Crises affecting banks are 
commonly macro-economic and general in nature, following asset market collapses and economic 
downturns. The deposit insurance and resolution fund can thus run out of funds. The ultimate backup of 
government support is needed to give the fund credibility. Legislation may contain an explicit provision 
for a loan from the Treasury or ministry of finance to the fund. Alternatively, there is an implicit 
backstop.  
Similarly, the government is the ultimate backstop for the central bank. While a central bank 
can provide unlimited liquidity (by expanding its balance sheet), its capacity to bear losses is limited 
to its capital (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). In the case of large losses on lender-of-last-resort 
loans, the government may need to replenish the capital of the central bank. In the UK, because of the 
risk to public funds, the Memorandum of Understanding on Crisis Management between HM Treasury 
and the Bank of England requires Treasury approval for any emergency liquidity assistance (lender of 
last resort) provided by the Bank. The arrow for the fiscal backstop is backward in Figure 3, illustrating 
our backward-solving approach towards governance. 
 
  
5. How does the Banking Union work? 
The governance framework can be applied to the new Banking Union. Figure 4 provides an 
overview of the agencies in the current Banking Union framework. The European Commission (EC) is 
the rule-maker and the key policy-maker initiating new policies and rules for the ﬁnancial system. In 
parallel, the European Banking Authority (EBA) drafts technical standards and develops the single 
rulebook for the EU internal market. It is important to note that this rule making has a EU-wide reach, 
while the Banking Union Area only includes the euro-area and opting-in countries. The second function, 
supervision, has now been delegated to the European Central Bank (ECB) under the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM). 
 
Figure 4: Agencies in the current Banking Union framework. 
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Note: The framework illustrates the ﬁve stages from rule-making to the ﬁscal backstop. The top line illustrates each function. 
The middle line shows the generic agency for each function in a national setting. The bottom line shows the (European) 
body for each function. 
Source: Adapted from Schoenmaker (2013). 
 
The shaded areas in Figure 4 then deal with crisis management. The first leg of crisis 
management is lender-of-last-resort support (also called emergency liquidity assistance) for illiquid, 
but solvent, banks. This should also become the responsibility of the ECB. However, at the time of 
writing, the responsibility still rests with the national central banks (NCBs), although NCBs needs 
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approval from the ECB to provide emergency liquidity assistance. Nevertheless, such assistance is 
currently for the risk and account of NCBs. The end game of any crisis is reached when banks are 
insolvent and have to be restructured or dissolved, which requires deposit insurance and/or resolution. 
Accordingly, we would argue for a Single Deposit Insurance and Resolution Board (SDIRB) (Gros and 
Schoenmaker, 2014).  
Nevertheless, the legislation provides only for a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) with a 
Single Resolution Board (SRB) and a Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Deposit insurance remains at the 
national level, though based on a common framework. This halfway house is not viable in the medium 
term. The political reality – in the direct aftermath of two financial crises – is that politicians and 
citizens are currently wary of underwriting all insured deposits at the euro-area level. When the banking 
system is more stable (inter alia better capitalised) and the economy has resumed its growth path, it 
may be a more suitable time to shift deposit insurance from the national to the euro-area level. 
The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) has been created to provide the ﬁscal backstop to 
member countries and possibly the banking systems of member countries in ﬁnancial distress. We 
argue that the ESM should also be able to provide a credit line to the Single Resolution Fund as well as 
to provide direct recapitalisation of troubled banks (see Section 6).  
 
5.1 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
The ECB started its supervisory role, in conjunction with the national supervisors (officially 
called national competent authorities) in November 2014. Within the SSM, the ECB has the central role. 
Just like the ECB Governing Council for monetary policy, the SSM is governed by a Supervisory Board of 
25 members, of which six are designated by the ECB and 19 from national supervisors. An important 
feature is that decisions are made by a single authority, by simple non-weighted majority rule, which 
enhances its European orientation. Day-to-day supervision of individual banks is conducted by groups 
of ECB and national supervisors, called Joint Supervisory Teams, acting under the coordination of the 
ECB. A team is in place for each supervised bank (see Angeloni, 2015). 
The ECB has extensive powers over the banks under its direct responsibility, covering all 
supervisory tasks: granting and withdrawing licenses, authorising mergers and acquisitions, 
determining how much capital banks should hold, setting other prudential requirements, all the way to 
asking for recovery plans and enacting early intervention for ailing banks. Figure 5 shows that these 
direct powers are aimed at the 123 significant banks in the euro area. These are not only the very large 
banks discussed in Table 3 in Section 3. Mody and Wolff (2015) differentiate between banks that fall 
into three size categories: small (assets below €100bn), medium (assets between €100bn and €500 
billion), and large (assets more than €500 billion). Of the €22 trillion in assets, the ‘small’ group has 
about 80 banks with €3.1 trillion, the ‘medium’ group has about 30 banks with €6.3 trillion, and the 
‘large’ group has only 13 banks with aggregate assets of €12.5 trillion3. 
The ECB has indirect powers over the around 3500 less significant banks. The national 
supervisors are the first point of call for these smaller banks. Nevertheless, the ECB has the power to 
overrule the national supervisors and give directions to less significant banks if the national 
supervisors are not complying with the agreed single regulatory framework. Moreover, the ECB has 
some direct powers, such as granting and withdrawing licenses, and authorising mergers and 
acquisitions, over the smaller banks. These direct powers relate to important milestones in a bank’s life 
(birth, marriage and death). Using game theory, this latent power gives national supervisors a strong 
incentive to play the cooperative game with the ECB. Otherwise, it may lose its powers over the less 
significant banks. The SSM system is thus incentive compatible and makes a single integrated 
approach towards the supervision of significant and less significant banks possible. For all practical 
purposes, we can thus truly speak of a single supervisory mechanism. 
                                                 
3 Checking the vulnerability of the SSM banks, Mody and Wolff (2015) find that the largest banks, with their scale economies 
and internationally diversified assets, appear to be out of the woods. But many of the small and medium-sized banks 
remain under considerable stress. The weakest of these banks are burdened by non-performing corporate loans and may 
need to be downsized or closed, where the SRM can play a useful role. 
Figure 5: The Single Supervisory Mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This diagram depicts the working of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
 
Going forward, an interesting question is at which level the ECB should enforce the regulatory 
requirements, such as capital and liquidity requirements (Angeloni, 2015). Should that be at the 
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market may emerge, where cross-border banking groups can transfer excess capital and liquidity 
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would reinforce the segmentation between national banking markets. This enforcement question is 
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5.2 The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
The Single Resolution Board (SRB) started its resolution role, in conjunction with the national 
resolution authorities, in January 2016. The SRM will inter alia apply the new bail-in rules of the 
Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which requires that at least 8 percent of total 
liabilities is bailed-in from shareholders and creditors before resolution is undertaken. Within the SRM, 
the SRB has a central role, but it has to work closely with the national resolution authorities, which are 
close to the banks and thus speak the language and know the local conditions. The SRB has an 
executive board with a chair, a (generally non-voting) vice-chair, and four other members. The division 
of labour is largely similar to that of the SSM. The SRB decides on the significant banks (as in the SSM) 
as well as cross-border banks. The national resolution authorities are responsible for resolution of the 
smaller national banks, unless there is funding from the Single Resolution Fund, and for the execution 
of large banks’ resolution schemes after these have been decided by the SRB. For the smaller banks, 
the SRB thus gets involved when resolution funding is needed in order to minimise the use of such 
funding. It should be stressed that the SRM is applicable to all banks in the participating countries 
(initially the euro-area countries). The task of the SRB is twofold: preparing ex-ante resolution plans and 
deciding on ex-post resolution actions. 
The SRB meets in two settings: an executive and a plenary session. In the executive session, 
the SRB consists of the executive board (ie the chair and the four executive directors) and the 
member(s) from the relevant national resolution authorities of the countries in which the (troubled) 
bank is operating. The executive session decides on the resolution plans and schemes for individual 
banks (with one exception, as explained below). The executive session decides by consensus. If there 
is no consensus, the chair and four executive members vote by simple majority. This voting procedure 
ensures that the European public interest is taken into account, while avoiding national interests. 
In its plenary session, the SRB comprises the executive board and all national members. The 
plenary session is responsible for general resolution policies and for resolution schemes whereby the 
funding from the Single Resolution Fund exceeds €5 billion. So the large cases in need of substantial 
funding are dealt with in the plenary session. 
The ECB and the European Commission have permanent observers, without voting power, in the 
SRB. Before taking a resolution action, three conditions need to be met: 1) the bank is failing or likely to 
fail; 2) there are no alternative private sector solutions; 3) resolution is necessary in the public interest. 
The ECB, as supervisor, decides on the first condition, after consultation of the SRB. But the SRB can 
also decide on the first condition, after informing the ECB. This ensures that the SRB has the power to 
act in case of forbearance by the ECB (see ASC, 2012, on forbearance). Next, the SRB decides on 
meeting the second and third condition. 
After that the SRB decides on the draft resolution scheme, in particular which liabilities to 
exclude from bail-in. The decision on the resolution scheme is reviewed by the European Commission 
(within 24 hours) to safeguard that the internal market principles are not violated (state aid control). 
The European Commission can object to the amount of funding from the Single Resolution Fund or 
judge that there is no threat to the public interest. In these cases, the Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN) gets involved. ECOFIN can approve or object (with motivation) to the Commission 
proposal when the European Commission concludes an absence of public interest or when the 
European Commission changes 5 percent or more in the proposed amount of funding from the Single 
Resolution Fund. After the decision is final, the SRB instructs the relevant national resolution 
authorities to take the necessary measures to implement the resolution scheme.  
 It should be stressed that the aim of the new legislation (BRRD and SRM) is to minimise 
resolution funding. As discussed above, a resolution scheme for a failed bank starts with the bail-in of 
shareholders and creditors for at least 8 percent of this bank’s total liabilities. Next, funding from the 
Single Resolution Fund is restricted to a maximum of 5 percent of total liabilities. The Single Resolution 
Fund aims to accumulate 1 percent of covered deposits of the euro-area banks, which amounts to €55 
billion. Importantly, the Single Resolution Fund represents private funding, collected through annual 
contributions levied on the euro-area banks. For the building-up of the Single Resolution Fund, there is 
an eight-year transition period, which is covered by an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) between the 
euro-area countries. In the first year, 40 percent of the national funds will be mutualised in the Single 
Resolution Fund; in the second year, a further 20 percent. In the next 6 years, 6.67 percent is added 
each year. This adds up to a 100 percent mutualisation of national compartments, which will then 
disappear.  
For the use of the Single Resolution Fund, there are separate voting procedures. During the 
transition period, a two third majority of the voting Board members representing 50 percent of 
contributions is needed. After the transition, again a two third majority of votes representing 30 percent 
of contributions is needed. Note that each Board member has one vote. Figure 6 summarises the 
working of the SRM. 
Figure 6: Single Resolution: Players and decision-making structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This diagram depicts the working of the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
Source: Adapted from Petersen (2014). 
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 6. Completing the Banking Union 
The original rationale for Banking Union is to organise bank risk sharing (crisis management) at 
the euro-area level. By inclination, the prevention (regulation and supervision) should also be 
organised at the euro-area level. While the latter has been largely achieved, the risk sharing is still very 
incomplete. That makes the Banking Union arrangement potentially unstable. First, there may be fights 
between the agencies operating at different levels, which go beyond the usual bureaucratic clatter of 
weapons. For example, if a bank would fail and the guaranteed deposits need to be repaid, the national 
deposit insurance authority may complain about the lack of supervision by the ECB and start a quarrel 
about the appropriate timing of closure (and hence deposit insurance pay-outs). As these agencies do 
not operate at the same level, there is no governmental mechanism (being the Prime Minister/Minister 
of Finance or the European Council/Ecofin) to bang heads together. Second, the framework is not 
incentive compatible (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2009). Following principal-agent theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), there is a risk of under-provision of supervisory effort, when a supervisor is not 
confronted with the costs of its (in)action. 
Third, and most important, the incomplete risk sharing does not adequately address the 
sovereign-bank loop. While there is uncertainty about the future divide between bail-in and bail-out 
(Véron, 2015), nation states may still have to fund bank bailouts, with potential ESM support given to 
the state. This instrument is labelled indirect recapitalisation (Art 15, ESM Treaty). Only when a state 
cannot provide support without triggering a fiscal crisis, the ESM may directly recapitalise a bank. 
Moreover, banks can still keep large holdings of bonds of their own government on their balance sheet. 
Erce (2015) provides evidence that the transmission of sovereign to bank risk works through the size 
of banks’ exposures to the sovereign. 
 
  
6.1 Need for European deposit insurance 
How to complete the Banking Union? Figure 7 shows the agencies in a completed Banking 
Union. On the top of the list is moving the lender of last resort and deposit insurance functions to the 
euro-area level. That makes the overall governance system incentive compatible. Moreover, it means 
that the fiscal backstop of these functions is no longer at the national level. That breaks the 
transmission from bank to sovereign risk in the bank-sovereign loop. A final element would be to enable 
direct bank recapitalisation from the ESM, without first waiting for the country to go bankrupt before 
enacting such direct recapitalisation. In risk-sharing terms, the ESM is behind the bank risk sharing, 
both indirectly by providing a credit line to the Single Deposit Insurance and Resolution Board, and 
directly by providing direct bank recapitalisation. The European arrangements would then match the US 
arrangements for bank risk sharing (Gros, 2012a). 
 
Figure 7: Agencies in a ‘completed’ Banking Union framework. 
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in a position to consider any bank from the Banking Union as their ‘home’ bank. The history in the 
United States of deposit insurance is revealing (Gros and Schoenmaker, 2014). Before the introduction 
of the FDIC as part of the New Deal legislation in the 1930s by Franklin Roosevelt, many of the state-
level deposit guarantee schemes went bankrupt because of a lack of geographic diversification and 
size (Golembe, 1960). The vicious circle between the national governments and banks is a reflection of 
a similar problem in Europe today. A final argument for a broad fund is that it keeps up the notion of an 
integrated banking market, at least in the Banking Union Area. 
Note that we argue for a fully-fledged Single Deposit Insurance (and Resolution) Fund. There 
are proposals to create a reinsurance scheme (Gros, 2012b). The national deposit insurance schemes 
remain in place, but they reinsure themselves in a larger European fund in case the deposit insurance 
pay-outs exceed the national fund. As usual with reinsurance, the national schemes pay a premium for 
this cover of extreme risks. Although this helps insuring against tail risk of multiple small national 
banks or a mid-sized/large bank failing, the national fund need to be refinanced by extra (future) 
premiums on the remaining national banks. If the national parts are relatively large in comparison to 
the reinsurance part, the drag on the economy remains because national banks have to refund the 
national fund through future deposit insurance premiums (Schoenmaker and Wolff, 2015). If, by 
contrast, the national parts are small, then the reinsurance scheme is basically a European scheme. 
But a reinsurance scheme is more complex and has more operational risk. It is therefore less conducive 
to depositors’ trust than a plain federal deposit insurance scheme. 
The second open issue is the transmission of sovereign to bank risk, caused by banks’ large 
holdings of government debt (European Systemic Risk Board, 2015). These sovereign exposures carry 
a zero risk weight and are exempt from large exposure rules in micro-prudential supervision. A large 
exposure limit on such holdings would be very powerful to break the sovereign-bank loop by forcing 
banks to diversify their government bond holdings. Such large exposure limits on companies work very 
well to prevent banks going bankrupt when a large company defaults on its bank loans. 
Political-economy considerations suggest that the policy actions are interrelated. Before 
northern Europe may want to agree to ‘European’ deposit insurance, they want at the minimum to 
ensure that the banks covered by this European deposit insurance scheme are not overly exposed to 
the southern European governments.  
 
7. Conclusions 
The idea of Banking Union is very powerful. It neatly complements the Economic and Monetary 
Union and has been instrumental in arresting the euro sovereign crisis. But after the immediate crisis 
was over, governments have started to shop selectively on the Banking Union list. The main message 
of this paper is that the governance framework for banking supervision and crisis management should 
be considered as an integrated package. Selective shopping creates new instabilities by non-aligned 
national and European agencies. We therefore argue in favour of transferring the lender-of-last-resort 
and deposit insurance functions also to the European level to join the European supervisory and 
resolution functions. 
Another tenet of this paper is that the long-term rationale behind Banking Union is related to 
cross-border banking in the Single Market. We therefore suggest that non-euro area members may also 
wish to join Banking Union at a later stage. Fortunately, the Banking Union legislation allows for such 
voluntary membership of the outs. That would also help to reduce the increasing tension between the 
ins and the outs within the European Union. 
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